Abstract. In Shamir's (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme (threshold scheme), a heavy computational cost is required to make n shares and recover the secret. As a solution to this problem, several fast threshold schemes have been proposed. This paper proposes a new (k, n)-threshold scheme. For the purpose to realize high performance, the proposed scheme uses just EXCLUSIVE-OR(XOR) operations to make shares and recover the secret. We prove that the proposed scheme is a perfect secret sharing scheme, every combination of k or more participants can recover the secret, but every group of less than k participants cannot obtain any information about the secret. Moreover, we show that the proposed scheme is an ideal secret sharing scheme similar to Shamir's scheme, which is a perfect scheme such that every bit-size of shares equals that of the secret. We also evaluate the efficiency of the scheme, and show that our scheme realizes operations that are much faster than Shamir's. Furthermore, from the aspect of both computational cost and storage usage, we also introduce how to extend the proposed scheme to a new (k, L, n)-threshold ramp scheme similar to the existing ramp scheme based on Shamir's scheme.
Introduction
A secret sharing scheme is an important tool for distributed file systems protected against data leakage and destruction, secure key management systems, etc. The basic idea of secret sharing introduced by Shamir and Blakley independently [1, 2] is that a dealer distributes a piece of information (called a share) about the secret to each participant such that qualified subsets of participants can recover the secret but unqualified subsets of participants cannot obtain any information about the secret. Shamir's threshold scheme is based on polynomial interpolation ('Lagrange interpolation') to allow any k out of n participants to recover the secret.
However, Shamir's scheme has two problems: large storage is required to retain all the shares, and heavy computational cost is needed to make shares and recover the secret due to processing a (k − 1)-degree polynomial.
In order to reduce each bit-size of shares in Shamir's scheme, ramp secret sharing schemes have been proposed [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] that involve a trade-off between security and storage usage. In ramp schemes, we can consider intermediate sets, which are neither qualified nor forbidden sets to recover the secret, and hence, partially leak information on the secret. For instance, in the (k, L, n)-threshold ramp scheme [3, 4] , we can recover the secret from arbitrary k or more shares, but no information about the secret can be obtained from any k − L or less shares. Furthermore, we can realize that every bit-size of shares is 1/L of the bit-size of the secret. However, an arbitrary set of k − l shares is an intermediate set which leaks information about the secret with equivocation (l/L)H(S) for l = 1, 2, . . . , L, where S denotes the random variable induced by the secret s.
On the other hand, as a solution to the heavy computational cost problem associated with Shamir's scheme with no leak of information about the secret from k − 1 or less shares, Ishizu et al. proposed a fast (2, 3)-threshold scheme [8] . By generalizing Ishizu et al.'s scheme for the number of participants, Fujii et al. introduced a fast (2, n)-threshold scheme [9, 10] . These schemes enable fast computation to make shares and recover the secret from two or more shares by using just EXCLUSIVE-OR(XOR) operations. In these schemes, no information about the secret can be obtained from one share, but the secret can be recovered from each pair of shares. Furthermore, every bit-size of shares equals the bit-size of the secret as with Shamir's scheme. Especially, in Fujii et al.'s scheme, shares are constructed by concatenating XORed terms of a divided piece of the secret and a random number with the properties of prime numbers. These XORed terms are circulated in a specific pattern and do not overlap with each other. Kurihara et al. proposed a fast (3, n)-threshold scheme using XOR operations [11] as an extension of Fujii et al.'s scheme by constructing shares with the secret and two sets of random numbers, which are concatenated XORed terms of a divided piece of the secret and two random numbers. This (3, n)-threshold scheme is an ideal scheme as with Shamir's and Fujii et al.'s. Since no method has ever been investigated to extend the circulation property of this (3, n)-threshold scheme, an extension of this (3, n)-threshold scheme has not been proposed before.
Shiina et al. proposed another fast (k, n)-threshold scheme using XOR or additive operations [12] . This scheme can be applied to a cipher or signature which uses a homomorphism, and leaks no information about the secret from less than k shares. However, every bit-size of shares is ( n C k − n−1 C k ) = O(n k−1 ) times as large as the bit-size of the secret. To address this efficiency problem, Kunii et al. introduced an alternative method [13] to construct shares in Shiina et al.'s scheme. However, the bit-size of shares is log 2 n or more times larger than the bit-size of the secret.
Thus, how to construct a fast (k, n)-threshold scheme using XOR operations such that every bit-size of shares equals the bit-size of the secret, where k ≥ 4 and arbitrary n, remained an open question.
Our Contributions. In this paper, we present a new (k, n)-threshold scheme which realizes fast computation to make shares and recover the secret by using just XOR operations. Our contribution can be summarized as follows:
-We realize a new (k, n)-threshold scheme by constructing shares with the secret and k − 1 sets of random numbers, which are concatenated XORed terms of a divided piece of the secret and k − 1 random numbers. These XORed terms are circulated in a specific pattern with k dimensions, and do not overlap with each other because the properties of prime numbers are used. -We show that the proposed scheme is a perfect secret sharing scheme, every combination of k or more participants can recover the secret, but every group of less than k participants cannot obtain any information about the secret. We also show that the proposed scheme is an ideal secret sharing scheme similar to Shamir's scheme, which is a perfect scheme such that every bitsize of shares equals that of the secret. -By an implementation on a PC, we show that the proposed scheme is able to make n shares from the secret and recover the secret from k shares more quickly than Shamir's scheme if n is not extremely large. Under our implementation, our scheme performs the operations 900-fold faster than Shamir's for (k, n) = (3, 11). -We introduce how to extend our (k, n)-threshold scheme to a new (k, L, n)-threshold ramp scheme which realizes not only fast computation but also reduction of storage usage to retain n shares.
Organization. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2, we give several notations and definitions, and provide a definition of the secret sharing scheme. In Section 3.1 of Section 3, we propose a new (k, n)-threshold scheme using just XOR operations. Moreover, in Section 3.3, we prove that our (k, n)-threshold scheme is an ideal secret sharing scheme as with Shamir's, and the efficiency of the proposed scheme is discussed in Section 4. In Section 5, we introduce how to extend our (k, n)-threshold scheme to a new (k, L, n)-threshold ramp scheme. Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 6.
Preliminaries

Notations and Definitions
Throughout this paper, we use the following notations and definitions:
-⊕ denotes a bit-wise EXCLUSIVE-OR(XOR) operation.
-∥ denotes a concatenation of binary sequences.
-n ∈ N denotes the number of participants.
-n p is a prime number such that n p ≥ n.
-Values of indexes of random numbers, divided pieces of the secret, pieces of shares, their XORed terms, and their random variables are elements of GF (n p ). Hence, X c(a±b) denotes X c(a±b) mod np .
-H(X) denotes Shannon's entropy of a random variable X.
-|X | denotes the number of elements of a finite set X . -2 X denotes the family of all subsets of X .
Secret Sharing Scheme
denote a dealer who selects a secret s ∈ S and gives a share w i ∈ W i to every participant P i ∈ P, where S denotes the set of secrets, and W i denotes the set of possible shares that P i might receive. The access structure Γ (⊂ 2 P ) is a family of subsets of P which contains the sets of participants qualified to recover the secret. Especially, Γ of a (k, n)-threshold scheme is defined by Γ = {A ∈ 2 P | |A| ≥ k}. Let S and W i be the random variables induced by s and w i , respectively. A secret sharing scheme is perfect if
where A ⊂ P denotes a subset, and V A = {W i | P i ∈ A} denotes the set of random variables of shares that are given to every participant P i ∈ A. For any perfect secret sharing scheme, the inequation H(S) ≤ H(W i ) is satisfied [14, 15] . Let p(s) and p(w i ) be the probability mass functions of S and W i defined as p(s) = Pr{S = s} and p(w i ) = Pr{W i = w i }, respectively. In general, the efficiency of a secret sharing scheme is measured by the information rate ρ [16] defined by
The maximum possible value of ρ equals one for perfect secret sharing schemes. When the probability distributions on S and W i are uniform, i.e. p(s) = 1/|S| and p(w i ) = 1/|W i |, the information rate is
that is, the ratio between the length (bit-size) of the secret and the maximum length of the shares given to participants. A secret sharing scheme is said to be ideal if it is perfect and ρ = 1 [16] [17] [18] . Shamir's scheme [1] is recognized as being a typical ideal secret sharing scheme.
A (k, n)-Threshold Scheme
In this section, we describe the proposed (k, n)-threshold scheme. This scheme enables to make n shares (distribution) and recover the secret from k or more OUTPUT : (w0, . . . , wn−1) 
12: end for 13: return (w0, . . . , wn−1) OUTPUT : s
shares (recovery) using just XOR operations, for arbitrary threshold k and the number of participants n. We realize this scheme by extending the circulation property of Kurihara et al.'s (3, n)-threshold scheme [11] . Moreover, we show that our scheme is an ideal scheme as with Shamir's.
Our Scheme
In this scheme, the secret s ∈ {0, 1} d(np−1) needs to be divided equally into
d , where n p is a prime number such that n p ≥ n, and d > 0 denotes the bit-size of every divided piece of the secret. Also, D uses n shares, w 0 , · · · , w n−1 , of a (k, n p )-threshold scheme to construct a (k, n)-threshold scheme if the desired number of participants n is a composite number. Table 1 and Table 4 denote the distribution algorithm and the structure of shares in our (k, n)-threshold scheme, respectively. To make shares, our (k, n)-threshold scheme requires 3 steps, where line 1, lines 2-6 and lines 6-13 in Table 1 
where 0
Finally, D concatenates these pieces and constructs shares
, and sends shares to each participant through a secure channel. If n < n p , lines 7-12 does not work for 0 ≤ i ≤ n p − 1 but it does for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, and hence D does not generate n p − n shares w n , · · · , w np−1 . Thus, it is possible to add new participants P n , · · · , P np−1 after distribution by generating w n , · · · , w np−1 anew as necessary. However, to generate new shares, k existing shares should be gathered, and all random numbers and the secret should be stored.
Eq. (2) shows that these pieces of shares are circulated in a specific pattern with k dimensions by the indexes of a divided piece of the secret k random numbers, and do not overlap with each other because the properties of prime numbers are used. Table 2 denotes the recovery algorithm in the scheme. First, each share is divided into d-bit pieces at lines 1-3. Next, at line 4, k(n p − 1)-dimensional vector w is generated, which is a vector of divided pieces of shares. At line 5, 
which is the generator matrix such that w = G · r. At line 7, the matrix
] is generated by column-wise concatenation, and transformed into a row echelon form
by performing the forward elimination step of Gaussian elimination with the elementary row operations on GF(2), where F G() and I k(np−1) denote a forward elimination function and the k(n p − 1) × k(n p − 1) identity matrix, respectively. Furthermore,Ḡ and J correspond to the transformed matrices from G and I k(np−1) , respectively. And,
is divided into block matrices denoted as follows:
respectively. J 0 and J 1 are an (n p − 1) × k(n p − 1) block matrix and a (k − 1)(n p − 1) × k(n p − 1) block matrix, respectively. Ø denotes a null matrix. Then, the backward substitution part of Gaussian elimination is executed on [G 0 J 0 ], and we obtain the matrix
, where BG() and M denote the function of backward substitution and a transformed matrix from J 0 , respectively. Finally, M AT () outputs M as a matrix to recover s 1 , . . . , s np−1 from divided pieces of shares.
Our (k, n)-threshold scheme proposed in this paper is a direct extension of Kurihara et al.'s (3, n)-threshold scheme [11] and Fujii et al.'s (2, n)-threshold scheme [9] in terms of the structure of shares. Accordingly, the distribution and recovery algorithms of our (k, n)-threshold scheme for k = 3 and k = 2 can be utilized as Kurihara et al.'s (3, n)-threshold scheme and Fujii et al.'s (2, n)-threshold scheme, respectively.
Example
We present the recovery procedure of our (k, n)-threshold scheme for k = 4 and n = n p = 5 as an example. Table 5 shows the structure of shares of the (4, 5)-threshold scheme.
Suppose that the participants P 0 , P 1 , P 2 and P 4 agree to recover the secret s with their shares w 0 , w 1 , w 2 and w 4 . At lines 1-3 of Table 2 , w 0 , w 1 , w 2 and w 4 are equally divided into d-bit pieces, w (0,i) , w (1,i) , w (2,i) and w (4,i) (0 ≤ i ≤ 3). Next, we obtain a 16-dimensional vector of divided pieces of shares w at line 4 of Table 2 , which is denoted as follows: (1, 0) , w (1, 1) , w (1, 2) , w (1, 3) , w (2, 0) , w (2, 1) , w (2, 2) , w (2, 3) , w (4, 0) , w (4, 1) , w (4, 2) , w (4, 3) ) T .
At line 5 of Table 2 , we execute the function M AT (0, 1, 2, 4) and obtain 16 × 16 binary matrix M. In the function M AT (), first, we obtain the generator matrix G from indexes of shares at lines 1-6 of Table 3 , which is denoted as follows:
1000 10000 10000 0000 0100 01000 01000 1000 0010 00100 00100 0100 0001 00010 00010 0010 1000 01000 00100 0001 0100 00100 00010 0000 0010 00010 00001 1000 0001 00001 10000 0100 1000 00100 00001 0010 0100 00010 10000 0001 0010 00001 01000 0000 0001 10000 00100 1000 1000 00001 00010 1000 0100 10000 00001 0100 0010 01000 10000 0010 0001 00100 01000 0001
At line 7 of Table 3 , we execute forward elimination step of Gaussian elimination on [G I 16 ] and obtain a row echelon matrix [Ḡ J] denoted as follows:
1000 10000 10000 0000 1000 0000 0000 0000 0100 01000 01000 1000 0100 0000 0000 0000 0010 00100 00100 0100 0010 0000 0000 0000 0001 00010 00010 0010 0001 0000 0000 0000 0000 11000 10100 0001 1000 1000 0000 0000 0000 01100 01010 1000 0100 0100 0000 0000 0000 00110 00101 1100 0010 0010 0000 0000 0000 00011 10010 0110 0001 0001 0000 0000 0000 00000 10111 1101 0010 0110 0100 0000 0000 00000 01111 1011 0100 1100 1000 0000 0000 00000 00101 1001 1001 0100 1101 0000 0000 00000 00011 1000 0111 1001 1110 0000 0000 00000 00000 1001 1110 0011 1111 0010 0000 00000 00000 0101 0110 1100 0010 1000 0000 00000 00000 0010 0011 0110 0001 0100 0000 00000 00000 0001 0001 0010 1010 1001
And also, [Ḡ J] is divided into six block matrices, Ø, G 0 , G 1 , G 2 , J 0 and J 1 , at line 7 of Table 3 The function M AT () outputs the block matrix M as a result. We recover all divided pieces of the secret at line 6 of Table 2 with M and w by the operation (s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 ) T = M · w, where each divided piece of the secret is obtained by the following XOR operations: (1, 2) ⊕w (2, 0) ⊕w (2, 2) ⊕w (4, 0) ⊕w (4, 3) , respectively. Thus, we have recovered the secret s = s 1 ∥ s 2 ∥ s 3 ∥ s 4 . 
The Proof of the Ideal Secret Sharing Scheme
Here, we introduce the following two theorems. 
where V A denotes a set of random variables of shares that are given to each participant in A. d with uniform probability 1/2 d . We define generator matrices U and V which satisfy the following equation: 
Proof (proof of Theorem 1). Let
A = {P t0 , . . . , P t k−2 } denote a set of k − 1 participants, where t 0 , . . . , t k−2 ∈ GF (n p ) are arbitrary numbers such that 0 ≤ t i , t j ≤ n − 1 and t i ̸ = t j if i ̸ = j. Correspondingly, let V A = {W t0 , . . . , W t k−2 } denote a set of k − 1w = U · r ⊕ V · s, = (w (t0,0) ,. . ., w (t0,np−2) ,. . ., w (t k−2 ,0) ,. . ., w (t k−2 ,np−2) ) T ,(4)
. , Sn p−1 ) = H(S).
Therefore, H(S|V A ) = H(S) is satisfied.
⊓ ⊔
Theorem 2. Let A denote an arbitrary set of participants such that |A| ≥ k.
Then, the recovery algorithm shown in Table 2 and Table 3 can recover all the divided pieces of the secret from shares given to each participant in A.
Proof (proof of Theorem 2).
Let A = {P t0 , . . . , P t k−1 } denote a set of k participants, where t 0 , . . . , t k−1 ∈ GF (n p ) are arbitrary numbers such that 0 ≤ t i , t j ≤ n − 1 and t i ̸ = t j if i ̸ = j. We define generator matrices U and V which satisfy the following equation: 
. . .
where α and β are denoted by
respectively. Thus, by the XOR operations with pieces of k shares, we can obtain all the elements of the set X denoted by
Then, since indexes are elements of GF (n p ), we can also obtain s α−1 ⊕ s β−1 from all the elements of X as follows:
Hence, we can consider the set X ′ to recover the secret, which is defined by
Then, the following set
is a field with order n p from Lemma 5, where C = 2(t k−2 − t k−1 ). Thus, the following equation is satisfied:
s 0 = 0 d was inserted as a singular point. Therefore, we can recover all the divided pieces of the secret sequentially as follows:
and since only XOR operations using the property of GF (n p ) are used, this sequential operation can be represented by the elementary row operation on
. From Eq.(6), the following equation is satisfied:
Thus, all the divided pieces of the secret can be recovered from k shares by using an elementary row operation on
. The elementary row operations do not change the solution set of the system of linear equations represented by a matrix. If it is possible to obtain the solution set by arbitrary elementary row operations, the corollary solution set is the same as the solution set obtained by Gaussian elimination. Therefore, our recovery algorithm using Gaussian elimination at lines 7-8 of Table 3 can recover all the divided pieces of the secret from k shares. ⊓ ⊔ 
where V A denotes a set of random variables of shares that are given to each participant in A. Thus, from these two theorems, Eq. (1) is satisfied, and the access structure Γ of our scheme is denoted by Γ = {A ∈ 2 P | |A| ≥ k}. Furthermore, since every bit-size of shares equals the bit-size of the secret if we can suppose that s ∈ {0,
the size of the secret is d(n p − 1) bits,
2 the information rate ρ equals one. Thus, as with Shamir's scheme, our scheme is also ideal.
Evaluation of Efficiency
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of our scheme by comparing it with Shamir's scheme. First, we show the result of computer simulation by implementing both our scheme and Shamir's. Next, we consider the two schemes from the perspective of computational cost.
Computer Simulation. We compared the proposed scheme with that of Shamir's for (k, n) = (3, 11), (3, 59) , (3, 109) , (5, 11) , (10, 11) and (10, 23) by implementation on a PC, where every scheme is implemented for n = n p . Fig.1 denotes the processing time required to make n(= n p ) shares from 4.5 MB data (secret) and recover the 4.5 MB secret from k shares, w 0 , · · · , w k−1 by using our scheme and Shamir's scheme. The simulation environment and conditions are summarized in Table 6 . For the implementation of Shamir's scheme, we used SSSS Version 0.5 [19] , which is a free software licensed under the GNU GPL. An 8-byte block was processed in each cycle in the distribution and recovery operations under Shamir's scheme. In Fig.1 , the horizontal axis and vertical axis denote pairs of This graph shows that our scheme performed processing much faster than Shamir's. In (3, 11)-threshold schemes, our scheme was more than 900-fold faster than Shamir's in terms of both distribution and recovery. Similarly, in (3, 59), (3, 109), (5, 11) , (10, 11) and (10, 23)-threshold schemes, Fig.1 shows that our scheme achieved far more rapid processing than Shamir's.
Consideration. In our proposed distribution algorithm, step 9 at Table 1 
Therefore, our distribution algorithm requires an average of
bitwise XOR operations to make n shares. If n = n p , it equals {(k − 1)n − 1} · log 2 |S|. Since the cost of modulo n p operations on indexes can be regard as being negligible by using the fixed generator matrix in a manner similar to the recovery algorithm, we omit the cost of the operations here for the sake of simplicity.
On the other hand, in the proposed recovery algorithm, we can assume that at the most {k(n p − 1) − 1}d XOR operations are required to recover one of the divided pieces of the secret with all divided pieces of k shares, and at the most {k(n p − 1)− 2}d XOR operations are required to recover one of the other divided pieces of the secret with k(n p − 1) − 1 divided pieces of k shares. Thus, the upper bound of the number of XOR operations required to recover the secret by using a block matrix M is roughly denoted by
The recovery algorithm also requires O(k 3 n p 3 ) bitwise XOR operations to execute forward elimination (step 7 of Table 3 ) and partial backward substitution (step 8 of Table 3 ) of Gaussian elimination as a pre-computation cost to obtain M at the function M AT ().
On the other hand, in Shamir's scheme, O(kn) and O(k log 2 k) arithmetic operations are required to make shares and recover the secret, respectively [1] .
From Fig.1 , it is evident that the processing time for distribution in both Shamir's and our scheme is linearly increasing with each of k and n. However, though the processing time for recovery in Shamir's scheme is constant and independent of n if threshold k is fixed, that of our scheme increases as the number of participants n(= n p ) grows in Fig.1 . The computational cost of recovery in Shamir's scheme depends only on k, but that in our scheme depends on both k and n p . Thus, though our scheme is much more efficient than Shamir's for not so large n p as shown in Fig.1 , our scheme will not perform faster processing to recover the secret than Shamir's if n p is extremely large. We will determine the upper bound of n p for the value of k as a future work, in which our scheme will be shown to be faster than Shamir's.
How to Extend Our Scheme to a Fast Ramp Scheme
In terms of improved efficiency for both computational cost and storage usage, a (k, L, n)-threshold ramp scheme [4, 3] based on our (k, n)-threshold scheme can be realized. In this section, we briefly show how the new ramp scheme can be constructed.
In the distribution phase of our (k, L, n)-threshold ramp scheme (1 ≤ L ≤ k − 1), the differences from our (k, n)-threshold scheme can be summarized as follows: 
The above differences mean that the ramp scheme can be realized by replacing L − 1 sets of random numbers by an L − 1 set of divided pieces of the secret, where each set of divided pieces of the secret has a singular point. On the other hand, we can recover the secret from k shares by similar recovery algorithm to our (k, n)-threshold scheme. The differences in the recovery phase are only the area of the generator matrix on which the partial backward substitution is performed and hence the size of matrix M.
Then, the bit-size of each share is 1/L of the bit-size of the secret, and the efficiency in terms of computational cost for both distribution and recovery is as follows: An average of O(kn) · log 2 |S| L bitwise XOR operations is required to make n shares. To generate matrix M, O(k 3 n 3 p ) bitwise XOR operations are required. Also, the upper bound of bitwise XOR operations to recover the secret by using M is O(kn p ) · log 2 |S|.
In a manner similar to [4] , it can be proved that the security property of this ramp scheme is same as Yamamoto's ramp scheme based on Shamir's scheme.
Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a new (k, n)-threshold secret sharing scheme which uses just XOR operations to make shares and recover the secret, and we proved that the proposed scheme is an ideal secret sharing scheme. We estimated the computational cost in our scheme and Shamir's scheme for values of k and n. Also, we implemented our scheme on a PC for specific parameters, and showed that our scheme was more efficient than Shamir's in terms of computational cost provided n is not extremely large. Moreover, we introduced an extension of our scheme to a new (k, L, n)-threshold ramp scheme, which can realize both fast computation and reduction of storage usage. 
Appendix 1 Lemma 1 -Linearly Independent and Dependent
Also, we have
.
by the elementary row operation if L = k, which satisfies the following equation:
respectively. We also describe the proof of this remark in the proof of Lemma 1.
Proof. U and V can be denoted by
respectively. I np−1 denotes an (n p −1)×(n p −1) identity matrix and E (j) (j ∈ GF (n p )) denotes the following (n p − 1) × n p matrix:
First, we consider the elementary row operation on
. The matrix U can be transformed into the following matrix U ′ by the elementary row operation:
where E
(i,j) = E (i) ⊕E (j) . Correspondingly, V is transformed into V ′ as follows:
Next, we consider the concatenated block matrix D which is defined by
Then, from Lemma 4, the rank of E (2) i,j (i ̸ = j) is n p − 1. Here, for the sake of simple description of the elementary row operation on D, we define the n p × n p matrix H (i,j) by adding one row to E (2) (i,j) with all rows of E (2) (i,j) as follows:
Since indexes are elements of GF (n p ), H (i,j) can be denoted as follows:
where L i is the rotated identity matrix which is defined by
Then, we consider the following matrix M to describe briefly the elementary row operation on D, which is defined as follows:
PL−1 H
Since the n p -th row of H (i,j) is generated from all rows of E (2) (i,j) , M is equivalent to D. And hence, P and Q are equivalent to U ′′ and V ′′ , respectively. Thus, the following equations are satisfied:
The rank of block matrix M (1,l) 
From Lemma 2, M can be transformed into the following matrixM by the
M2
whereP andQ are denoted bȳ
respectively. From Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, the XORed vectors from the first row to the (n p − 1)-th row ofM i andP (1 ≤ i ≤ L − 1) equal the n p -th row as follows:
where m (i,j) and p (i,j) denote the j-th rows ofM i andP i , denoted as follows, respectively:
Since the rank of H (i,j) equals n p −1, rank(M i ) = rank(P i ) = n p −1 is satisfied. Hence, from the structure ofM andP, the following equation is satisfied:
Thus, the following equation is satisfied:
Therefore, the rank of
. and all rows of U are linearly independent, i.e. rank(U) = L(n p − 1), if 1 ≤ L ≤ k − 1. 
Thus, from the structure ofM, the following equations are satisfied:
Therefore, the rank of [ U V ] equals k(n p − 1) and all rows of U are linearly dependent, i.e. rank(U) = (k − 1)(n p − 1), if L ≥ k. Moreover, we can obtain the following vector withM:
. . . 
Proof (proof sketch). The proof of this lemma can be derived by the elementary row operation on M (1) with mathematical induction. We can obtain M (2) by the following elementary row operation on M (1) : . . . h .
